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Abstract—Multivariate time series (MTS) regression tasks are
common in many real-world data mining applications including
finance, cybersecurity, energy, healthcare, prognostics, and many
others. Due to the tremendous success of deep learning (DL)
algorithms in various domains including image recognition and
computer vision, researchers started adopting these techniques
for solving MTS data mining problems, many of which are
targeted for safety-critical and cost-critical applications. Un-
fortunately, DL algorithms are known for their susceptibility
to adversarial examples which also makes the DL regression
models for MTS forecasting also vulnerable to those attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has explored
the vulnerability of DL MTS regression models to adversarial
time series examples, which is an important step, specifically
when the forecasting from such models is used in safety-
critical and cost-critical applications. In this work, we leverage
existing adversarial attack generation techniques from the image
classification domain and craft adversarial multivariate time
series examples for three state-of-the-art deep learning regression
models, specifically Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM), and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU).
We evaluate our study using Google stock and household power
consumption dataset. The obtained results show that all the eval-
uated DL regression models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
transferable, and thus can lead to catastrophic consequences
in safety-critical and cost-critical domains, such as energy and
finance.
Index Terms—Multivariate time series, Regression, Deep learn-
ing, Adversarial examples, FGSM, BIM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Time series forecasting is an important problem in data
mining with many real-world applications including finance
[1]–[4], weather forecasting [5], [6], power consumption mon-
itoring [7], [8], industrial maintenance [9], [10], occupancy
monitoring in smart buildings [11], [12], and many others.
Recently, deep learning (DL) models showed tremendous
success in analyzing time series data [1], [13] when compared
to the other traditional methods. This is due to the fact
that DL models can automatically learn complex mappings
from multiple inputs to outputs. Interestingly, DL models can
be easily fooled by adversarial examples [14], [15]. From
the perspective of image processing or computer vision, an
adversarial example can be an image formed by making small
perturbations (insignificant to the human eye) to an example
image. Another interesting fact is that the adversarial examples
can often transfer from one model to another model, known
as black-box attacks, which means that it is possible to attack
DL models to which the adversary does not have access [16],
[17]. In recent years, many techniques have been proposed for
increasing the robustness of DL algorithms against adversarial
examples [18]–[23], however, most of them have been shown
to be vulnerable to future attacks [24].
Adversarial attacks in deep learning have been extensively
explored for image recognition and classification applications.
However, their application to the non-image domain is vastly
under-explored. This also includes the lack of studies apply-
ing adversarial examples to time series analysis despite the
increasing popularity of DL models in time series analysis.
Very recently, the authors in [25] showed that a deep neural
network (DNN) univariate time series classifier (specifically
ResNet [26]) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Unfortu-
nately, to the knowledge of the authors, there exists no research
work to date evaluating the impact of adversarial attacks
on multivariate time series (MTS) deep learning regression
models. This is indeed a major concern as potential adversarial
attacks are present in many safety-critical applications that
exploit DL models for time series forecasting. For instance,
adding small perturbations to multivariate time series data
(using false data injection methods [27]) that uses a DL
regression model [28] for smart grid electric load forecasting
can generate wrong predictions, thus may lead to a nation-
wide power outage.
In this paper, we apply and transfer adversarial attacks
from the image domain to deep learning regression models
for MTS forecasting. We present two experimental studies
using two datasets from the finance and energy domain. The
obtained results show that modern DL regression models are
prone to adversarial attacks. We also show that adversarial
time series examples crafted for one network architecture
can be transferred to other architectures, thus holds their
transferability property [16]. Therefore, this work highlights
the importance of protecting against adversarial attacks in deep
learning regression models for safety-critical MTS forecasting
applications.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
• Formalize adversarial attacks on DL regression models
for MTS forecasting.
• Crafting adversarial attacks for MTS DL regression
models using methods that are popular in the image
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Fig. 1: Example of perturbing the multivariate time series by
adding imperceptible noise
domain and apply them to the finance and energy domain.
To be specific, we use the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [14] and basic iterative method (BIM) [15] to
craft adversarial examples for Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) [29], Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [30], and
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [31] regression
models.
• An empirical study of adversarial attacks on two datasets
from the finance and energy domain. We highlight the
impact of such attacks in real-life scenarios using the
Google stock [32] and household electric power con-
sumption dataset [33].
• A comprehensive study of the transferability property of
adversarial examples in DL regression models.
• A discussion on the potential defense techniques to be
considered in future research on this topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly discusses deep learning for multivariate time series
regression and adversarial attacks. Section III formalizes the
MTS DL regression and explains FGSM and BIM algorithm
for crafting adversarial examples. Section IV compares the
performance of CNN, LSTM, and GRU on Google stock
household electric power consumption dataset, and evaluates
the impacts of crafted adversarial examples on their perfor-
mance. The transferability property of the attacks is evaluated
in this section with a brief discussion on the potential defense
mechanism. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of DL MTS regres-
sion models and adversarial attacks in deep learning. A brief
survey of state-of-the-art methods in these two areas is also
presented in this section.
A. Deep learning for time series forecasting
Time series forecasting is a challenging and important prob-
lem in data science and data mining community. Therefore,
hundreds of methods have been proposed for their analy-
sis [34]. With the success of machine learning (ML) algorithms
in different domains, ML techniques for time series forecasting
is also popular [35], [36]. However, among these methods,
only a few (when compared to the non-DL methods) have
considered DL methods for time series forecasting [37]–[39].
In this work, we focus on the time/cost-sensitive and safety-
critical applications of deep learning time series forecasting,
which motivates us for investigating the impact of adversarial
attacks on them. Specifically, we explore the impact of adver-
sarial attacks on LSTM, CNN, and GRU. All of these models
are known for their effectiveness in time series forecasting.
LSTM is capable of learning long-term dependencies using
several gates and thus suits well the time series forecasting
problems. In [40], authors employ an LSTM model for pre-
dicting the traffic flow with missing data. The other successful
applications of LSTM in time series forecasting includes
petroleum production forecasting [41], financial time series
forecasting [42], solar radiation forecasting [43], and remain-
ing useful life prediction of aircraft engines [44]. GRU is an
improvised version of Recurrent Neural Network(RNN) [45],
and also effective in time series forecasting [46]. For in-
stance, in [47], authors employ 1D convnets and bidirectional
GRUs for air pollution forecasting in Beijing, China. The
other applications of GRU models in time series forecasting
include personalized healthcare and climate forecasting [48],
mine gas concentration forecasting [49], smart grid bus load
forecasting [50]. In [51], authors present a CNN-based bagging
model for forecasting hourly loads in a smart grid. Apart from
the energy domain, CNNs are also useful for financial time
series forecasting [1], [52].
In [53], time-series data from smart grids are analyzed for
the detection of electricity theft. In such use cases, perturbed
data can help thieves to avoid being detected. Using adversarial
attacks, a hacker might generate such perturbed synthetic data
to bypass the system’s attack detection techniques without
even having access or knowledge about the DL model used
for decision making [16], [17]. Perturbing the data recorded by
sensors placed on safety-critical applications (using false data
injection techniques [27], [54]) such as aircraft engines, smart
grids, gas pipeline, etc. have a catastrophic impact on human
lives and productivity, whereas attacks on financial data [55]–
[57] has a direct impact on the economy. Indeed, the list of
potential attacks presented in this section is not exhaustive due
to the space limitation.
B. Adversarial attacks
The concept of adversarial attack was proposed by Szegedy
et al. [58] at first for image recognition. The main idea
is to add a small perturbation to the input images which
is insignificant to human eyes, but as a result, the target
model misclassifies the input images with high confidence.
The severity of such attacks is shown by the researchers in
a recent experiment where a strip of tape on a 35 mph limit
sign was added which tricked a self-driving car into acceler-
ation to 85 mph [59]. Based on this idea proposed in [58],
many researchers have developed algorithms [14], [15], [58],
[60] for constructing such adversarial examples relying on
the architecture and parameters of the DL model. Most of
these adversarial attacks are proposed for image recognition
tasks. A fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [14] attack was
introduced in the year 2014 which signifies the presence of
adversarial examples in image recognition tasks. Followed by
FGSM, an iterative version of it, known as the basic iterative
method (BIM) [15] was proposed in the year 2016. BIM
showed more effectiveness in crafting a stealthier adversarial
example, however, it comes with a higher computational cost.
Comprehensive reviews of adversarial attacks in DL models
in different applications can be found in [61]–[64]
Interestingly, the adversarial attack approaches for multi-
variate time series DL regression models have been ignored
by the community. There are only two previous works that
consider adversarial attacks on time series. In [65], the au-
thors adopt a soft K-Nearest-Neighbours (KNN) coupled with
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) and show that the adversarial
examples can fool the proposed classifier on a simulated
dataset. Unfortunately, the KNN classifier is no longer con-
sidered the state-of-art classifier for time series data [66].
The authors in [25], utilize the FGSM and BIM attacks to
fool Residual network (ResNet) classifiers for univariate time
series classification tasks. In our work, we also employ the
FGSM and BIM attacks, however, we apply and evaluate their
impacts on DL regression models for mutivariate time series
forecasting.
In summary, our work sheds light on the resiliency of
DL regression models for multivariate time series forecasting
in real-world safety-critical and cost-critical applications (as
explained in section II-A). This will guide the data mining,
data science, and machine learning researchers to develop
techniques for detecting and mitigating adversarial attacks in
time series data.
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR MULTIVARIATE TIME
SERIES
In this section, we formalization of the problem, and present
the FGSM and BIM attack algorithms that we use to generate
adversarial MTS examples for the DL models.
A. Formalization of MTS regression
Definition 1: Let X be a multivariate time series (MTS). X
can be defined as a sequence such that X = [x1, x2, ..., xT ],
T =| X | is the length of X , and xi ∈ RN is a N dimension
data point at time i ∈ [1, T ].
Definition 2: D = (x1, F1), (x2, F2), ..., (xT , FT ) is the
dataset of pairs (xi, Fi) where Fi is a label corresponding
to xi.
Definition 3: Time series regression task consists of training
the model on D in order to predict Fˆ from the possible inputs.
Let f(·) : RN×T → Fˆ represent a DL model for regression.
Definition 4: Jf (·, ·) denotes the cost function (e.g. mean
squared error) of the model f .
Algorithm 1: FGSM attack on multivariate time series
Input : Original MTS X and its Fˆ
Output : Perturbed MTS X ′
Parameter: 
η =  · sign(OxJf (X, Fˆ ));
X ′ = X + η;
Definition 5: X ′ denotes the adversarial example, a perturbed
version of X such that Fˆ 6= Fˆ ′ and ‖X −X ′‖ ≤ . where
 ≥ 0 ∈ R is a maximum perturbation magnitude.
Given a trained deep learning model f and an input MTS
X , crafting an adversarial example X ′ can be described as a
box-constrained optimization problem [64].
min
X′
‖X ′ −X‖ s.t.
f(X
′
) = Fˆ ′, f(X) = Fˆ and Fˆ 6= Fˆ ′
Let η = X − X ′ be the perturbation added to X . Fig.1
shows the process where a perturbation η is added to the
original MTS X for crafting an adversarial example X
′
.
B. Fast gradient sign method
The FGSM was first proposed in [14] where it was able to
fool the GoogLeNet model by generating stealthy adversarial
images. FGSM calculates the gradient of the cost function
relative to the neural network input. This attack is also known
as the one-shot method as the adversarial perturbation is
generated by a single-step computation. Note, FGSM is an
approximate solution based on linear hypothesis [61]. Adver-
sarial examples are produced by the following formula:
η =  · sign(OxJf (X, Fˆ )) (1)
X ′ = X + η (2)
Here, Jf is the cost function of model f , Ox indicates the
gradient of the model with respect to the original MTS X
with the correct label Fˆ ,  denotes the hyper-parameter which
controls the amplitude of the perturbation and X ′ is adversarial
MTS. Algorithm 1 shows different steps of the FGSM attack.
C. Basic iterative method
The BIM [15] is an extension of FGSM. In BIM, FGSM
is applied multiple times with small step size and clipping is
performed after each step to ensure that they are in the range
[X − ,X + ] i.e.  − neighbourhood of the original MTS
X . BIM is also known as Iterative-FGSM as FGSM is iterated
with smaller step sizes. Algorithm 2 shows different steps
of the BIM attack, where it requires three hyperparameters:
the per-step small perturbation α, the amount of maximum
perturbation , and the number of iterations I . Note, BIM
does not rely on the approximation of the model, and the
adversarial examples crafted through BIM are closer to the
original samples when compared to FGSM. This is because
the perturbations are added iteratively and hence have a better
Algorithm 2: BIM attack on multivariate time series
Input : Original MTS X and its Fˆ
Output : Perturbed MTS X ′
Parameter: I, , α
X ′ ← X;
while i = 1 ≤ I do
η = α · sign(OxJf (X ′, Fˆ ));
X ′ = X + η;
X ′ = min{X + ,max{X − ,X ′}};
i++;
end
chance of fooling the network. However, compared to FGSM,
BIM is computationally more expensive and slower.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the crafted adversarial examples
on two datasets (from the finance and energy domain) and
present the obtained results. We also provide a brief discussion
on potential defense mechanism for detecting the adversarial
MTS examples in DL regression models. For the sake of
reproducibility and to allow the research community to build
on our findings, the artifacts (source code, datasets, etc.) of the
following experiments are publicly available on our GitHub
repository1.
A. Attacks on household power consumption
Due to the increase in demand for efficient energy needs,
there is a need for a smart infrastructure to meet the growing
demands and to generate energy more efficiently. Recently,
deep learning [67]–[69] has shown tremendous success in
forecasting the energy demands by training on the past power
consumption data and forecasting the energy consumption in
the future. This indeed helps in making an informed decision
of how much energy should be generated for a given day in
the recent future, avoids the excessive generation of surplus
energy, and thus helps in reducing the loss of resources,
manpower, and cost. In this context, an adversarial attack could
result in incorrect predictions of global active power, which
is the power consumed by electrical appliances other than the
sub-metered appliances. Such an incorrect forecast may lead
to either excessive surplus or inadequate generation of energy–
both of which have a direct impact on cost, productivity,
available resources, and environment.
In this work, we evaluate the impact of adversarial at-
tacks on household energy forecasting using the individ-
ual household electric power consumption dataset [33]. The
household power consumption dataset is a multivariate time
series dataset that includes the measurements of electric power
consumption in one household with a one-minute sampling
rate for almost 4 years (December 2006 to November 2010)
and collected via sub-meters placed in three distinct areas.
The dataset is comprised of seven variables (besides the
1https://github.com/dependable-cps/adversarial-MTSR
date and time) which includes global active power, global
reactive power, voltage, global intensity, and sub-metering
(1 to 3). We re-sample the dataset from minutes to hours
and then predict global active power using seven variables
or input features (global active power, global reactive power,
voltage, global intensity, and sub-metering (1 to 3)). Then
we use the first three years (2006 to 2009) for training our
three DL models (LSTM, GRU, and CNN), and last year’s
data to test our models. The DL architecture of the DL
models can be represented as LSTM(100,100,100) lh(14),
GRU(100,100,100) lh(14), and CNN(60,60,60) lh(14). The
notation LSTM(100,100,100) lh(14) refers to a network that
has 100 nodes in the hidden layers of the first LSTM layer,
100 nodes in the hidden layers of the second LSTM layer,
100 nodes in the hidden layers of the third LSTM layer, and
a sequence length of 14. In the end, there is a 1-dimensional
output layer. In Fig. 2, we compare the performance of these
three DL architectures in terms of their root mean squared er-
ror (RMSE) [70]. From Fig. 2, it is evident that the LSTM(100,
100, 100) has the best performance (with least RMSE) when
predicting the global active power (without attack) which was
trained with 250 epochs using Adam optimizer [71] and
grid search [72] for hyperparameter optimization to minimize
the objective cost function: mean squared error (MSE). The
hyperparameter settings for the evaluated DL models are
shown in Table I.
Fig. 3 shows an example of the normalized FGSM and
BIM attack signatures (adversarial examples) generated for
the global reactive power variable (an input feature in the
form of a time series). Similar adversarial examples are
generated for the remaining five input features to evaluate
their impact on the LSTM, GRU and CNN models for energy
consumption prediction (global active power prediction). As
shown in Fig. 3, the adversarial attack generated using BIM is
close to the original time series data which makes such attack
stealthy, hard to detect and often bypass the attack detection
algorithms. The impact of the generated adversarial examples
on the household electric power consumption dataset is shown
in Fig. 4. For the FGSM attack (with  = 0.2), we observe
that the RMSE for the CNN, LSTM and GRU model (under
attack) are increased by 19.9%, 12.3%, and 11%, respectively,
when compared to the models without attack. For the BIM
attack (with α = 0.001,  = 0.2, and I = 200), we also
observe the similar trend, that is the RMSE of the CNN, LSTM
and GRU models increased in a similar fashion, specifically
by 25.9%, 22.9%, and 21.7%, respectively for the household
electric power consumption dataset. We observe that for both
FGSM and BIM attacks, it is evident that the CNN model is
more sensitive to adversarial attacks when compared to the
other DL models. Also, BIM results in a larger RMSE when
compared to the FGSM. This means BIM is not only stealthier
that FGSM, but also has a stronger impact on DL regression
models for the this dataset.
For instance, as shown in Fig. 4a, the CNN MTS regression
model forecasts the global active power (without attack) to
be 2.10 kW and 4.51 kW on 161st hour and 219th hour,
(a) CNN(60,60,60) lh(14), RMSE=0.562
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(b) LSTM(100,100,100) lh(14), RMSE=0.541
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(c) GRU(100,100,100) lh(14), RMSE=0.543
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Fig. 2: Comparison of deep learning algorithms for power consumption dataset
(a) Adversarial example crafted for CNN
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(b) Adversarial example crafted for LSTM
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(c) Adversarial example crafted for GRU
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Fig. 3: Attack signatures for power consumption dataset; FGSM ( = 0.2) and BIM (α = 0.001,  = 0.2, and I = 200)
TABLE I: Hyperparameter settings for the DL models
DL
models
Power consumption dataset Google stock dataset
Hidden
neurons
Batch
size Epochs
Hidden
neurons
Batch
size Epochs
CNN 60,60,60 512 200 60,60,60 14 250
LSTM 30,30,30 32 250 100,100,100 14 300
GRU 30,30,30 32 250 100,100,100 14 300
respectively. After performing the FGSM and BIM attack, the
same CNN MTS regression model forecasts the global active
power to be 1.36 kW and 0.37 kW on 161st hour, and 5.24
kW and 6.94 kW on 219th hour, respectively. This represents a
35.2% and 82.3% decrease, and a 16% and 53.8% increase in
the predicted values on the 161st and 219th hour respectively
(when compared to the without attack situation). Such an
under-prediction as a consequence of attack may result in the
inadequate generation of energy, thus leading to a failure of
meeting the future energy demands with a potential power
outage. In contrast, over-prediction may result in the surplus
generation of energy leading to increased cost and waste of
resources.
B. Attacks on stock prices
Data scientists and financial theorists have been employed
for the past 50 years to make sense of the market by in-
creasing the return on the investment. However, due to the
multidimensional nature, the scale of the problem, and its
inherent variation with time makes it an overwhelming task.
Advancements in DL algorithms and their application to fi-
nance [1]–[4] has shown tremendous prospect to revolutionize
this domain including stock market analysis and prediction.
DL algorithms can learn the multivariate nature of the stocks
and can make more accurate predictions [73], [74]. In this
context, an adversarial attack could result in incorrect stock
price predictions, which may, in turn, result in a diminishing
return of the investment, and have a significant impact on the
stock market.
In this work, we evaluate the impact of adversarial attacks
on Google stock prediction using the Google stock dataset
[32]. The Google stock dataset contains Google stock prices
for the past 5 years. This multivariate time series dataset has
(a) CNN during FGSM (RMSE=0.674) and
BIM (RMSE=0.708)
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(b) LSTM during FGSM (RMSE=0.608) and
BIM (RMSE=0.665)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Time steps in hours
G
lo
ba
l
ac
tiv
e
po
w
er
(k
ilo
w
at
ts
) True
Predicted
FGSM
BIM
(c) GRU during FGSM (RMSE=0.603) and
BIM (RMSE=0.661)
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Fig. 4: Power consumption prediction after FGSM ( = 0.2) and BIM (α = 0.001,  = 0.2, and I = 200)
(a) CNN(60,60,60) lh(60), RMSE=0.81
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(b) LSTM(30,30,30) lh(60), RMSE=0.77
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(c) GRU(30,30,30) lh(60), RMSE=0.76
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Fig. 5: Comparison of deep learning algorithms for Google stock dataset
six variables namely date, close, open, volume, high, and low.
We use 30% of the latest stock data as our test dataset and
we train our three DL models (LSTM, GRU, and CNN) on
the remaining 70% of the data. To predict the Google stock
prices, we consider the average stock prices and volume of
the stocks traded from the previous days as input features. As
the Google stock price prediction is dependant on multiple
input features, it is a multivariate regression problem. We
utilize the past 60 days of data to predict the stock price
of the next day. The architectures of our DL models can be
represented as LSTM(30,30,30) lh(60), GRU(30,30,30) lh(60),
and CNN(60,60,60) lh(60). From Fig. 5, it is evident that the
GRU(30, 30, 30) has the best performance (with least RMSE)
when predicting stock opening prices (without attack) which
was trained with 300 epochs using Adam optimizer [71] and
grid search [72] for hyperparameter optimization to minimize
the objective cost function: mean squared error (MSE). The
hyperparameter settings for the evaluated DL models are
shown in Table I.
Fig. 6 shows an example of the normalized FGSM and
BIM attack signatures (adversarial examples) generated for
the volume of stocks traded (an input feature in the form of a
time series). Similar adversarial examples are also generated
for other input features to evaluate their impact on the LSTM,
GRU and CNN models for the Google stock prediction (stock
opening price). From Fig.6, we observe that the adversarial
attack generated using BIM is close to the original time series
data, which makes such attacks hard to detect and thus have
high chances of bypassing the attack detection methods. The
impact of the crafted adversarial examples on the Google stock
dataset is shown in Fig. 7. For the FGSM attack (with  = 0.2),
we observe that the RMSE for the CNN, LSTM and GRU
model (under attack) are increased by 16%, 12.9%, and 13.1%,
respectively, when compared to the models without attack. For
the BIM attack (with α = 0.001,  = 0.2 and I = 200), we
also observe the similar trend, that is the RMSE for the CNN,
LSTM and GRU model (under attack) are increased by 35.2%,
27.2% and 28.9%, respectively. Similar to our observation on
the power consumption dataset, we notice that the CNN model
is more sensitive to adversarial attacks when compared to the
other DL models. Moreover, we also observe that BIM results
in a larger RMSE when compared to the FGSM.
For instance, as shown in Fig. 7a, the CNN MTS regression
model forecasts the normalized stock opening price (without
attack) to be $0.781 on day 11 and $0.662 on day 297. After
performing the FGSM and BIM attack, the same CNN MTS
(a) Adversarial example crafted for CNN
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(b) Adversarial example crafted for LSTM
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(c) Adversarial example crafted for GRU
0 20 40 60
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Time steps in days
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
vo
lu
m
e
of
th
e
st
oc
k Original
FGSM
BIM
Fig. 6: Attack signatures for google stock dataset; FGSM ( = 0.2) and BIM (α = 0.001,  = 0.2, and I = 200)
(a) CNN during FGSM (RMSE=0.94) and
BIM (RMSE=1.1)
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(b) LSTM during FGSM (RMSE=0.87) and
BIM (RMSE=0.98)
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(c) GRU during FGSM (RMSE=0.86) and
BIM (RMSE=0.98)
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Fig. 7: Stock price prediction after FGSM ( = 0.2) and BIM ( α = 0.001,  = 0.2, and I = 200 )
regression model forecasts the normalized stock opening price
to be $0.864 and $0.975 on day 11, and $0.607 and $0.556
on day 297, respectively. This represents a 10.6% and 24.8%
increase, and an 8.3% and 16% decrease in the predicted stock
prices on day 11 and 297, respectively (when compared to the
without attack situation). Such an over-prediction and under-
prediction in stock prices may result in investors investing
more and investing less in a particular stock whereas the stock
prices are decreasing and increasing, respectively, thus leading
to a loss in the return of investment in both cases.
C. Performance variation vs. the amount of perturbation
In Fig. 8, we evaluate the LSTM and GRU regression
model’s performance with respect to the different amount
of perturbations allowed for crafting the adversarial MTS
examples. We pick the LSTM and GRU as they showed the
best performance for the MTS regression task in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 5. We observe that for larger values of , FGSM is not very
helpful in generating adversarial MTS examples for fooling
the LSTM and GRU regression model. In comparison, with
larger values of , BIM crafts more devastating adversarial
MTS examples for fooling both the regression models and
thus RMSE follows an increasing trend. This is due to the
fact [15] that BIM adds a small amount of perturbation α
on each iteration whereas FGSM adds  amount of noise for
each data point in the MTS that may not be very helpful in
generating inaccurate forecasting with higher RMSE values.
(a) Power consumption dataset
(LSTM model)
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(b) Google stock dataset (GRU
model)
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Fig. 8: RMSE variation with respect to the amount of pertur-
bation () for FGSM and BIM attacks
TABLE II: Transferability of FGSM and BIM attacks for power Consumption and Google stock datasets. The notation X/Y
represents the percentage of RMSE increase using FGSM/BIM
DL
models
Transferability (% increase of RMSE)
Power consumption dataset Google stock dataset
CNN LSTM GRU CNN LSTM GRU
CNN - 10.2/18.7 10.8/18.1 - 16.9/24.1 16.2/23.4
LSTM 8.3/16.9 - 7.5/11.2 13.1/18.6 - 11.1/16.4
GRU 9.2/16.5 6.6/11.7 - 13.8/19.7 11.6/16.3 -
D. Transferability of adversarial examples
To evaluate the transferability of adversarial attacks, we
apply the adversarial examples crafted for a DL MTS regres-
sion model on the other DL models. Table II summarizes the
obtained results on transferability. We observe that for both
datasets, the adversarial examples crafted for CNN are the
most transferable. This means a higher RMSE is observed
when adversarial examples crafted for the CNN model are
transferred to other models. For instance, adversarial MTS
examples crafted using BIM for the CNN regression model
(Google stock dataset) causes a 23.4% increase when trans-
ferred to the GRU regression model. A similar trend is also
observed, however, with a lower percentage increases, when
adversarial examples crafted for GRU and LSTM regression
models are transferred to the other DL regression models. In
addition, the obtained results also show that BIM is better
than FGSM in fooling (even when they are transferred) the
DL models for MTS regression tasks, e.g. BIM increases the
RMSE more when compared to the FGSM. Overall, the results
show that the adversarial examples are capable of generalizing
to a different DL network architecture. This type of attack is
known as black box attacks, where the attackers do not have
access to the target models internal parameters, yet they are
able to generate perturbed time series that fool the DL models
for MTSR tasks.
E. Defense against adversarial attacks
Researchers have proposed different types of adversarial at-
tack defense strategies so far [61] most of which are applicable
to the image domain. The existing adversarial attack defense
strategies can be divided into three categories: modifying data,
modifying models, and using auxiliary tools. Modifying data
refers to modifying the training dataset in the training stage,
or changing the input data in the testing stage. It also includes
adversarial training [14], blocking the transferability [75],
data compression [76], gradient hiding [77], and data ran-
domization [78]. In contrast, modifying models refer to the
modification of DL models, such as defensive distillation [79],
feature squeezing [80], regularization [81], deep contractive
network [82] and mask defense [83]. Using additional tools
to the DL models is referred to as using an auxiliary tool
which includes the use of defense-GAN [84], MagNet [85] and
high-level representation guided denoiser [86]. Unfortunately,
most of these detectors are prone to adversarial attacks due
to the fact that these attacks are designed specifically to fool
such detectors [64]. Hence, the time series, data mining and
machine learning need to pay special attention to this area as
DL MTS regression models are gaining popularity in the safety
and cost-critical application domains. A potential idea for the
detection of adversarial examples in MTS DL regression mod-
els can be the use of inductive conformal anomaly detection
method [87], [88]. Another potential idea is to leverage the
decades of research into non-probabilistic classifiers, such as
the nearest neighbor coupled with DTW [64].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of adversarial at-
tacks on deep learning (DL) regression models for multivariate
time series (MTS) regression. We formalized and evaluated
two adversarial example generation techniques, originally pro-
posed for the image domain for the MTS regression task. The
obtained results showed how adversarial attacks can induce
inaccurate forecasting when evaluated on the household power
consumption and the Google stock dataset. We also observed
that BIM is not only a more stealthy attack but also causes
higher damage in DL MTS regression models. Finally, among
the three evaluated DL regression models, the obtained results
revealed that the adversarial examples crafted for CNN are
more transferable when compared to the others. Through our
work, we shed light on the importance of acknowledging
adversarial attacks as one of the prominent threats to the
DL MTS regression models as they find their applications in
safety-critical and cost-critical domains.
In the future, we would like to extend our work by adapting
other adversarial attacks for the image domain and evaluate
them for MTS DL regression. In addition, we also plan to
investigate defense strategies to detect and mitigate adversarial
threats in DL regression models.
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